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COMMENTS
FACTOR REPRESENTATION IN THE
APPORTIONMENT OF INCOME FROM
INTANGIBLES
I. INTRODUCTION
Taxation has been a source of heated conflict between the
citizen and state throughout our nation's history. Govern-
ment control in the form of taxation is often repugnant to a
nation whose principles historically center around notions of
individualism and free market economics. Although taxation
is a necessity that provides the revenues required for public
goods, the Constitution restrains government overreaching in
the form of taxation.
As the nation grew, the tax system evolved into a large,
complicated structure. The tax system touched all citizens,
from the welfare recipient to the corporate entity. Business
also expanded: small family businesses developed into corpo-
rations that grew beyond home-state borders. In America,
this post-Industrial Revolution expansion of corporate enter-
prises was evidenced by companies like Ford Motor Co. and
Standard Oil.
As a result of this expansion, many corporations created
numerous subsidiaries to handle separate but related activi-
ties. Related corporations that interacted with one another
in areas of ownership, use, and management became what
are known as unitary businesses.1 Unitary, multistate (or
multinational) businesses posed a dilemma for state govern-
ments. The states needed a method for measuring a corpora-
tion's intrastate activities (and taxing those activities) when
the corporation's activities extended beyond their borders.
1. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (6th ed. 1990). Unitary business is a
term used to describe highly interdependent or interrelated multistate or inter-
national corporations where income arises from operation of the business as a
whole. Id. For example, parent and subsidiary corporations, together, may be
considered a single unitary business for tax purposes.
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Generally, it was not until the 1940's that states began
considering different methods of taxation or testing those
methods against constitutional restraints.2 Three primary
methods were considered: separate geographical account-
ing,3 allocation,4 and apportionment. 5 This comment will fo-
cus on apportionment, and correspondingly, a three-factor ap-
portionment formula. This taxation method was approved by
the United States Supreme Court as a constitutional mecha-
nism that enabled states to tax unitary business income in a
way that reasonably reflects a unitary business' in-state
activities.6
Presently, an issue exists as to the appropriate method of
apportioning intangible business income.7 The focus of this
comment is on state taxation of a unitary business, and the
need for factor representation8 of income from intangibles in
the apportionment formula. This comment is not meant to be
2. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
3. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20
(1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
Separate geographical accounting purports to isolate portions of income earned
within the different states. Id. Certain economic benefits are derived from op-
erating on the larger scale of a unitary business. Id. Geographical accounting
does not account for these economic benefits, nor the resulting increase in in-
come earned. Id.
4. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:
CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES, 9.02, at 9-6 (2d ed. 1993). Alloca-
tion for taxation purposes assigns income to the corporation's state of commer-
cial domicile. Allocation leaves nothing to tax for the remaining states where
the corporation conducts business. Id.
5. Id. 9.01, at 9-5 & n.1. Allocation is to be distinguished from appor-
tionment, which mathematically divides income among several jurisdictions,
enabling the states to tax the portion of income derived from the corporation's
in-state activities. Id.
6. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-42 (1980).
Essentially, the three-factor formula uses the property, payroll, and sales fac-
tors of the corporations that comprise the unitary business to determine how
much of the unitary income should be apportioned to individual states. The fact
that the Court did not consider whether the application of the formula was con-
stitutional is noteworthy, because it is the fulcrum upon which the apportion-
ment controversy balances.
7. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
8. Factor representation reflects in the denominators of the three-factor
apportionment formula a portion of the subsidiaries' property, payroll, and
sales factors that contributed to the individual amounts of intangible income
received by the parent company. This addition to the denominators results in a
decrease of the net income taxable by the state, because the value of the prop-
erty, payroll, and sales of the unitary business everywhere would increase. See
infra text accompanying note 62.
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an exhaustive study of the three-factor formula, nor of factor
representation. It is merely an attempt to give the reader a
basic understanding of formula apportionment, and to offer a
proposal to end the controversy surrounding the proper ap-
portionment of intangibles.
First, the background section will explain the constitu-
tional implications of the apportionment formula, and trace
the evolution of applicable constitutional tests of apportion-
ment formulas.9 Second, the analysis will explain the current
controversy regarding the application of the formula to intan-
gible income, as depicted through a line of circuit court and
state supreme court cases. 10 A solution to the controversy
will be discussed in the proposal section.1' This comment will
suggest that factor representation in the taxation of intangi-
ble income is necessary for the proper application of the ap-
portionment formula.
II. BACKGROUND
The states' power to tax corporate income stemming from
out-of-state activities is subject to federal constitutional con-
straints.' 2 These constraints stem from the Due Process
Clause, which prohibits states from attributing income de-
rived extraterritorially to the state, and the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, which proscribes discrimination
against interstate commerce. 13 A tax will survive constitu-
tional challenge if it is "applied to an activity with a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."'4
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part III.
11. See infra part IV.
12. In reference to state taxation, the Commerce Clause and the Due Pro-
cess Clause have been interpreted as prohibiting states from regulating beyond
their borders. See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, 8.07,
at 8-44. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. The Due Process Clause prohibits the states from "depriving any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
13. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, 8.07, at 8-44.
14. Id. 4.08, at 4-36 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 279 (1977)); see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207 (1980) (upholding the Wisconsin Department of Revenue's tax assess-
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In order for a state to tax an entity's out-of-state activi-
ties, those activities must in some way be connected to the in-
state activities.15 Also, the corporation must avail itself of
some of the benefits of carrying on business in the state in
order to justify the state's power to tax its income.16 To reach
this result, three issues must be considered. First, is the en-
tity operating as a unitary business?1 7 Second, when decid-
ing which tax method to apply, allocation or apportionment,
is the corporate income to be taxed characterized as business
or nonbusiness income?18 Third, is the state's corporate in-
come tax formula fair and nondiscriminatory? 9
A. Is the Entity a Unitary Business?
Since this discussion centers around multistate corpora-
tions, a court reviewing a tax apportionment challenge must
first ask whether or not the multistate operations are part of
a unitary business. 20 This inquiry is necessary since the in-
come sought to be taxed must be related to the operations
carried on in the state that seeks to tax the corporation.21 If
the corporation's in-state operations are not part of the multi-
state unitary business, generally, the state has no right to tax
the multistate income. Apportionment will not be used be-
cause the state only has the power to tax within its own bor-
ders.22 Basically, a unitary business exists when there are
interrelations or interdependence of one corporation, gener-
ally a parent corporation, and one or more subsidiaries in
multistate or international locations.2 3
ment against Exxon, a vertically integrated petroleum company, as satisfying
the Due Process Clause requirement of a "minimal connection" or "nexus").
15. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
16. Id.
17. See infra part II.A.
18. See infra part II.B.
19. See infra part II.C.
20. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); see also
Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that
Asarco's payor subsidiaries were discrete enterprises and not part of Asarco's
unitary business); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980) (holding that Mobil and its subsidiaries comprised a unitary business).
21. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20
(1980); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
22. Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 219-20.
23. BLAcK's LAw DICTONARY 1533 (6th ed. 1990).
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1. Butler Bros. v. McColgan
In Butler Bros. v. McColgan,24 the United States
Supreme Court explained why the unitary principle entitles a
state to tax a portion of the income generated by the unitary
business' in-state activities.25 The Court discussed the three
unities that arise from a unitary business: unity of use, unity
of ownership, and unity of management. 26 If the manufactur-
ing process of a product is scattered throughout several
states, there is unity of use, and the manufacturing factors
are primary in the realization of profits. Unity of ownership
and unity of management result in increased efficiency in op-
erations and savings in production, which would not occur if
each branch operated separately.2" Thus, the three unities
affect the income generated by the unitary business in a mul-
tistate framework.
In Butler, the Court agreed with the California Supreme
Court that the property, payroll, and sales factors properly
reflect the contributions to the total unitary income from the
related in-state business activities.29 The factors enable a
fair apportionment of the benefits realized and the income
earned from the unitary business to the state.3 0 The Court
noted that there had been no showing that the income used in
the apportionment formula was not connected to or generated
from the unitary business. 3 '
24. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
25. Butler Bros., 315 U.S. at 508-09.
26. Id. Unity of ownership and management is best exemplified by the par-
ent/subsidiary relationship, where the parent owns a large portion of the sub-
sidiary and is involved with the management decisions. For example, Butler
Brothers is a wholesale dry goods and general merchandising company with its
home office in Chicago, Illinois. Butler Brothers owns seven wholesale distrib-
uting houses, even though each house maintains its own stock of inventory,
sales, and accounting. The home office is also involved with the buying and
purchasing divisions of Butler Brothers' seven wholesale distributing houses.
Id.
27. Id. (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 133
(1931)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 509.
30. Butler Bros., 315 U.S. at 509.
31. Id. This additional note indicates that the property, payroll, and sales
factors may not properly reflect the activities that generate the income. This is
true, for example, if intangible income from dividend payments by a subsidiary
are included in the total unitary income of the payee company, while the payor
subsidiary is not considered a part of the unitary business. Id.
4891996]
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The presence of the unitary business within the state
provides the nexus, or minimum connection, necessary to jus-
tify a state's taxation of a corporation's income generated by
interstate activities. 2 In deciding if a business is unitary, a
court will consider whether the corporation has vertical inte-
gration,33 central management, 4 intercorporate training, 5
or related business activities.3 6 These aspects of the multi-
state or international relationship must contribute in some
way to the intrastate values of the business enterprise.3 7
If there is no such contribution, then the state cannot
reach that income. A state also cannot reach income that is
unrelated to the in-state operations. Such income is classi-
fied as nonbusiness income, which, because it does not arise
from the unitary operations, is not subject to apportionment.
Rather, the income is allocated in total to the corporation's
commercial domicile.
A corporation can avoid state income tax on income gen-
erated by out-of-state activities if the entity can prove that
the activity or income is nonbusiness related, constituting a
discrete business enterprise.3 8
2. Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission
In Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,3 9 the con-
stitutionality of including intangible income in the total taxa-
ble income was challenged. 40 The intangible income that
comprised the subject of the challenge included dividend and
32. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980)
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)); see
also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
33. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271,
280-83 (1924). Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd.'s vertical integration involved the
ownership and control over the stages of production in the brewing and selling
of Bass Ale.' Id. at 278.
34. See supra note 26. Centralization of management is synonymous with
unity of management.
35. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 365
(1982). Intercorporate training of personnel is used to transmit the parent's
operational and managerial methods to the subsidiaries, or to enable the free
exchange of personnel among the subsidiaries. Id.
36. See Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1982);
F.W. Woolworth Co., 458 U.S. at 364-70 (1982).
37. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
38. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
39. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
40. Asarco Inc., 458 U.S. at 307.
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interest payments from certain subsidiaries, and capital
gains from the sale of stock.41
Asarco is incorporated in New Jersey and is commer-
cially domiciled in New York.42 It mines, smelts, and refines
metals in various states, including Idaho.4 s Idaho adopted its
own version of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Pur-
poses Act 4 4 (UDITPA) in 1965, apportioning business income
by the three-factor formula and allocating nonbusiness in-
come to the state of commercial domicile.45
The Court considered whether Asarco and the payor sub-
sidiaries operated as a unitary business. It found that,
although Asarco owns majority shares in those subsidiaries,
the subsidiaries are discrete from Asarco's activity in Idaho
because Asarco neither controls the management of the com-
panies, nor asserts control over the boards of directors.46
3. F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Revenue
Department
In a companion case, F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Rev-
enue Department,47 the Court again considered the constitu-
tionality of taxing dividend income from payor subsidiaries
that do not conduct business in the taxing state.48 Woolworth
engages in the retail sale of various merchandise and is com-
mercially domiciled in New York.49 Similar to Idaho and
many other states, New Mexico has its own version of
UDITPA, which apportions business income and allocates
nonbusiness income.50
The Court focused on three factors to decide whether
Woolworth and its subsidiaries operate as a unitary business:
functional integration, centralization of management, and
41. Id.
42. Id. at 309.
43. Id.
44. See infra note 55.
45. Asarco Inc., 458 U.S. at 311 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 63-3027(a)(4) (Supp.
1981)).
46. Id. at 322-28.
47. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
48. F.W. Woolworth Co., 458 U.S. at 354.
49. Id. at 356.
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-4-1 to -21 (Michie 1981).
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economies of scale.51 The Court found that Woolworth was
not functionally integrated with the subsidiaries because it
dealt exclusively with the retail sale of goods, unlike the sub-
sidiaries which dealt with each of the individual stages of
production and marketing. 2
The Court reasoned that there was no centralization of
management, since none of the subsidiaries' management
had been trained or employed by the parent company, and
retail policies were independent.53 Without functional inte-
gration or centralized management, the Court could not find
the requisite connection between New Mexico and the divi-
dend income, thereby holding New Mexico's taxation of Wool-
worth's dividend income unconstitutional under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.54
In the Asarco and Woolworth cases, the Court did not
specifically consider the constitutionality of including intan-
gible income in the apportionment formula. This considera-
tion was precluded by the Court's determination that the sub-
sidiaries were not part of the parent company's activities
within the respective states, and they could not be considered
part of a unitary system for tax purposes.
B. Business v. Nonbusiness Income: Which Formula
Should Be Applied?
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 55
provides for two methods for taxing income from intangibles:
allocation56 or apportionment.57 Income from intangibles in-
cludes dividends, interest, capital gains from stock sales, and
royalties from patents or copyrights.58 The question of
whether intangible income, or any type of income, is allocated
51. F.W. Woolworth Co., 458 U.S. at 364 (restating Mobil's discussion of
Butler's three significant economic benefits that derive from unitary opera-
tions). See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
52. F.W. Woolworth Co., 458 U.S. at 364.
53. Id. at 366-67.
54. Id. at 372-73.
55. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME TAX PURPOSEs ACT, 7A U.L.A. 331 (1985) [herein-
after UDITPA]. In 1957 UDITPA was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Association.
It is a uniform tax allocation system, and a majority of states have adopted
substantial portions of it.
56. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, 9.02, at 9-6.
57. Id. 9.01, at 9-5 & n.1.
58. See id. 9.08, at 9-35.
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or apportioned depends on whether it is business income or
nonbusiness income. 59
Business income arises "from transactions and activity in
the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business," and
includes intangible income "if the acquisition, management,
and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the
taxpayer's regular trade or business operations."60 To deter-
mine a state's share of business income, a three-factor appor-
tionment formula is generally applied to all business in-
come. 61 A mathematical representation of the formula is:
(Property Receipts Payroll)
(in-state + in-state + in-state)(ev-erywhere everywhere everyw-here) Total Net y taxable
3 net y =  by state62
The formula determines the net income taxable by the state.
First, the average of the ratios of payroll, property and
sales factors of the unitary business within the state to those
factors of the unitary business everywhere within the United
States is determined. 63 Second, the average is multiplied by
the entity's apportionable base. The result is the amount of
business income to be apportioned to the state.64
The only other type of income is nonbusiness income,
which is "all income other than business income."65 Nonbusi-
ness income is either allocated to the enterprise's commercial
domicile or to the business situs of the source of the income.66
A leading case on the classification of intangible income
as either business or nonbusiness income was Mobil Oil Corp.
59. Id. 9.07[2], at 9-29.
60. UDITPA, supra note 55, § 1(a).
61. Id. § 9. See supra note 6.
62. Homart Dev. Co. v. Norberg, 529 A.2d 115, 118 (R.I. 1987).
63. This assumes a "water's edge" method of taxation. Most states now
limit their taxation to domestic (water's edge) income. Previously, many states
attempted to tax worldwide income. See generally Nicholas S. Freud & Walter
M. Kolligs, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Worldwide Reporting and Unitary
Taxation, J. INT'L TAX'N, August 1994, at 340.
64. See generally Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) (approving
California's three-factor apportionment formula). "[Tlhese factors may properly
be deemed to reflect 'the relative contribution of the activities in the various
states to the production to the total unitary income,' so as to allocate to Califor-
nia its just proportion of the profits earned by appellant from this unitary busi-
ness." Id. at 509.
65. UDITPA, supra note 55, § l(e).
66. Id.
1996]
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v. Commissioner of Taxes.67 The Court considered whether
there was something in the nature of intangible income that
precluded a state from apportioning it.68
Mobil Oil Corporation is an integrated petroleum busi-
ness, but it also has mining and chemical operations.6 9 Its
commercial domicile is New York, and it has subsidiaries and
affiliates worldwide.7 ° Mobil's Vermont operation deals in
the wholesale and retail marketing of its petroleum products
and, Mobil contends, does not conduct business with Mobil's
other affiliates. 71 Mobil, the parent, received dividend in-
come from its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide. The is-
sue in the case was whether or not the dividend income
should be classified as business income, which would allow
Vermont to tax its share of income.72
Vermont uses the UDITPA three-factor apportionment
formula for taxing corporate business income.73 Mobil
treated the intangible business income on its Vermont re-
turns as "nonapportionable," thereby lowering its Vermont
tax liability significantly.74 The Vermont Department of
Taxes recalculated Mobil's apportionable income, including
the intangible income Mobil had deemed "nonapportionable,"
and assessed Mobil accordingly.75 Mobil brought action
against the state. Mobil claimed that the taxation of the in-
come was unconstitutional under the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses because the result was not a fair apportion-
ment.76 Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the adjudication
of the claim had been narrowed to solely considering whether
dividend income was apportionable.77
The Court rejected Mobil's contention that there was no
minimum connection between Vermont and the managing of
67. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
68. Mobile Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 425.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 427-28.
71. Id. at 428. Mobil contends that the worldwide subsidiaries are discrete
from Mobil's operations in Vermont. Id.
72. Id. at 425.
73. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 429. See also supra text accompanying
notes 61-62.
74. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 430.
75. Id. at 430-32.
76. Id. at 432.
77. Id. at 435-36.
[Vol. 36494
FACTOR REPRESENTATION
investments or business activities of the payor corporations.78
Mobil argued that separate accounting could be used when
measuring Mobil's Vermont activities and the payor corpora-
tions' activities, and that apportionment was not necessary.79
The Court, citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan,80 noted that sep-
arate accounting failed "to account for contributions to in-
come resulting from functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale.""
The Court reasoned that these factors of profitability
arose from business operations as a whole and, therefore,
could not be attributed to a single source. 82 The Court con-
cluded that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of
state income taxation is the unitary-business principle," and
the taxpayer must show that the income was generated by a
nonbusiness related activity or by a discrete business enter-
prise. 8 In the absence of such proof, there is an incontesta-
ble presumption of the requisite nexus.8 4 The Court held that
if the underlying activities generating the dividend income
are derived from the operating activities of the functionally
integrated whole, the income is constitutionally
apportionable.85
The Butler Bros., Asarco, Woolworth, and Mobil line of
cases provides some guidance on apportioning the income of
multistate corporations. First, the corporation challenging
the tax must be part of a unitary business.86 Second, the in-
come at issue must be business income. In other words, the
income must have arisen out of the regular course of opera-
tions of the business. Finally, the apportionment formula
must not give the taxing state more than its appropriate
78. Id. at 436, 442.
79. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438.
80. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
81. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 439.
84. See id. at 439-40.
85. See id. at 440.
86. Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Corm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 319 (1982); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 362 (1982); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1942).
87. Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 327 (1982); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 371-72 (1982); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 442 (1980); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942).
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share of unitary income.8 8 This final step in the analysis con-
siders whether the apportionment is fair.
C. Is the Three-Factor Apportionment Formula Fair?
A constitutional requisite for apportionment formulas is
that they be "fair" and nondiscriminatory.8 9 This fairness re-
quirement measures the internal and external consistency of
the formula.9" An apportionment formula is internally con-
sistent if, applied in every jurisdiction, it would result in no
greater than 100% of the unitary business income being
taxed.91 External consistency exists when the factors reason-
ably reflect how the income was generated. 92 The Court "will
strike down the ... apportionment formula if the taxpayer
can prove 'by "clear and cogent evidence"93 that the income
attributed to the State is in fact "out of all appropriate pro-
portions to the business transacted... in that State,"94 or has
"led to a grossly distorted result." ' ,95
In addition to being fair, the apportionment formula
must not discriminate against interstate or foreign com-
merce. 96 The threat of double taxation exists when jurisdic-
tions differ in their approach to taxation, for instance, when
allocation or apportionment is used inconsistently across ju-
risdictions.97 However, the complete elimination of overlap-
ping taxation among jurisdictions would require the Court to
decide on a constitutionally uniform method and application
88. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
89. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
90. Id. Internal and external consistency were parameters established by
the Court as a guide to determining the fairness of an apportionment formula.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. See also AT&T v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 422 N.W.2d 629 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1988). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the Department's
apportionment formula violated the external consistency requirement because
too much was apportioned to Wisconsin and other jurisdictions where AT&T
operated, and too little was apportioned to other jurisdictions where AT&T
functioned. Id.
93. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 170 (quoting Norfolk & W.R.R. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)).
94. Id. (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135
(1931)).
95. Id. (quoting Norfolk & W.R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326
(1968)). See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
96. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
97. Id. at 170-71.
496 [Vol. 36
FACTOR REPRESENTATION
of corporate tax.98 The Court is reluctant to get involved in
this sort of judicial legislation.99
The Court has accepted the three-factor formula as being
constitutionally fair because it sorts out accounting distor-
tions caused by the multiple inputs in a unitary system. 100
The Court has noted that apportionment methods would be
held to a higher scrutiny in cases involving international sub-
sidiaries and the threat of double taxation. 101
Accordingly, the California apportionment formula was
held to a higher scrutiny in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board,1 0 2 because of its potential effect on international com-
merce. 10 3 The Court scrutinized the formula in two ways.
First, the Court asked if there was a substantial risk of inter-
national multiple taxation. 10 4 The Court distinguished Cali-
fornia's apportionment method from the alternative "arm's
length approach," which is a general rule not to tax any in-
come specifically resulting from foreign commerce. 0 5
Although most countries apply the "arm's length approach" to
taxation of international commerce, their applications of the
approach differ.1 0 6 Inconsistent approaches among different
jurisdictions create the possibility of double taxation on a cor-
poration. 0 7 Generally, if an apportionment formula meets
the internal and external consistency standards established
in Container Corp., the tax will be deemed constitutionally
fair.'0 8
98. Id. at 171.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 183.
101. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 171.
102. Id. at 159. Container Corporation challenged California's corporate
franchise tax of income from foreign subsidiaries. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 185-86. See also Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979). The Court struck down the tax at issue due to the existence of
double taxation, noting that the scrutiny applied must consider the context of
the tax. Id. at 451.
105. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 190.
106. Id. at 191.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 185; see also NCR Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 856
P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 595 A.2d
1039 (Me. 1991); NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 402 S.E.2d 666
(S.C. 1991); NCR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86 (Minn.
1989); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 544 A.2d
764 (Md. 1988); AT&T v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 422 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
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Second, the Court asked whether California was permit-
ted to adopt formula apportionment where it "may impair
federal uniformity . . . [and] prevents the Federal Govern-
ment from 'speaking with one voice' in international
trade."10 9 The Court concluded that the California apportion-
ment method did not interfere with the government's foreign
trade policies. 110
The issue of discrimination in violation of the Commerce
Clause111 was again raised in Kraft General Foods v. Iowa
Department of Revenue." 2 Kraft General Foods is a unitary
business with operations in the United States and foreign
countries.11 ' At issue in the case was Iowa's inclusion of sub-
sidiary dividends in Kraft's tax base.1 14
Each of Kraft's six subsidiaries was incorporated abroad,
and their operations in foreign commerce were supported by
legitimate business reasons.1 1 5 Iowa's tax code follows the
federal tax scheme by allowing corporations to take a deduc-
tion for dividends received from domestic, but not foreign,
subsidiaries.116 Unlike the federal tax scheme, however,
Iowa does not allow a credit for taxes paid to foreign countries
to offset the tax paid on the subsidiary's dividend income. 117
Kraft was assessed a tax only on its dividend income
from foreign subsidiaries, and was not allowed a credit for the
taxes paid to the six foreign countries. The Supreme Court
held that the Iowa statute facially discriminates against for-
eign commerce in violation of the Foreign Commerce
Clause.' Once again, the use of an apportionment formula
without factor representation, although not specifically men-
tioned, lead to a discriminate tax.
Presently, case law suggests that a challenge against an
apportioned state tax assessment will undergo a three-tiered
analysis. The source of the income subject to taxation must
109. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448, 453 (1979)
(quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
110. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 (1982).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
112. 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
113. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 505 U.S. at 72.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 76.
116. Id. at 73.
117. Id. at 75.
118. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 505 U.S. at 82.
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be from companies that are part of a unitary business. 119 The
unitary business principle justifies a state's taxation of in-
come that is partly derived from out-of-state activities. 2 '
The unitary income subject to taxation must be business in-
come. 12 1 The rationale behind the business income require-
ment is that if the income is the product of business activi-
ties, a state is constitutionally empowered to tax companies
for benefits received from operating within the state.122 Fi-
nally, the apportionment method applied to the unitary busi-
ness income must be fair. 123 However, at least one question
remains to be decided, namely whether or not the present ap-
plication of the three-factor formula to income from in-
tangibles is constitutionally valid.
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has found that the three-factor
formula offers a balance between the state's revenue raising
tax power and the individual's right to be protected from ex-
traterritorial taxation. 124 The Butler Bros., Asarco, Wool-
worth, Mobil, Container Corp., and Kraft line of cases estab-
lishes the constitutionality of the three-factor apportionment
formula. 125 Inclusion of the property, payroll, and sales fac-
tors enables the state to tax values earned within its
borders. 126
The constitutionality of the apportionment formula de-
rives from the assertion that states may only tax income
earned from activities performed within their borders. 127 The
formula multiplies the apportionable base by the arithmetic
mean of the payroll, property, and sales factors. 128 Taking
119. Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501 (1942).
120. See supra part II.A.
121. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, 1 9.07[2], at 9-29.
122. See supra notes 12-16, 59-62 and accompanying text.
123. See supra part II.C.
124. Amicus Brief of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. at 8, NCR Corp. v. Taxa-
tion & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 93-541), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
125. See supra part II.
126. See supra note 62.
127. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
128. See UDITPA, supra note 55, § 9; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 429 n.4 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315
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the precept that states may only tax income earned within
their borders and that the apportionment formula obtains
that result, it logically follows that intangible business in-
come from out-of-state, payor subsidiaries should not be in-
cluded in the total income of the payee when the payroll,
property, and sales factors of the payor companies are not in-
cluded in the apportionment formula. Otherwise, the state
unfairly overtaxes the corporation.
This factor representation issue arises when the payor
subsidiary is excluded from the unitary return, and therefore,
its factors are omitted. Payors can be omitted when they are
unitary, but, because of a state statute requirement (usually
an ownership threshold), they are not included in the tax
return.
Justice Stevens' final remarks, in his now famous Mobil
dissent, are the most widely cited with respect to the factor
representation issue.12 9 He argued that the application of
Vermont's apportionment formula to Mobil's net income was
arbitrary and unconstitutional.1 3 0  Stevens remonstrated
that no attempt was made to incorporate the property, pay-
roll, and sales factors of the payor subsidiaries into the appor-
tionment formula.1 3 1 "Unless the sales, payroll, and property
values connected with the production of income by the payor
corporations are added to the denominator of the apportion-
ment formula, the inclusion of earnings attributable to those
corporations in the apportionable tax base will inevitably
cause Mobil's Vermont income to be overstated."3 2 This re-
mark embodies the factor representation controversy.13 3
U.S. 501, 503 (1942); Homart Dev. Co. v. Norberg, 529 A.2d 115, 117-18 (R.I.
1987); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, 9.01, at 9-6.
129. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 449 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent in Mobil is often cited as au-
thority by proponents of factor representation.
130. Id.
131. Id. If the majority considered the subsidiaries to be part of the unitary
business, and not discrete, then the subsidiaries' factors should have been in-
cluded in the apportionable base to be in conformity with the unitary business
principle.
132. Id. at 461.
133. Id. at 460-61. Stevens also argued that the Court narrowed its holding
in avoidance of this constitutional issue. Id. at 461. Stevens first argued that
the dividend income was improperly included in the apportionable unitary in-
come because it was generated from discrete subsidiaries. Id. at 460. The sub-
sidiaries were neither involved with the petroleum business, nor connected to
the marketing business in Vermont. Id. Second, he argued that the Court
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States nationwide apply the three-factor apportionment
formula without factor representation to corporate income,
and include the dividend, interest income, royalties, and
other forms of intangible business income from nonunitary
subsidiaries in the tax base.1 3 4 State taxing authorities and
corporate taxpayers alike are left with little guidance from
formula apportionment jurisprudence.
The three-tier analysis used when determining the con-
stitutional validity of an apportionment formula is well es-
tablished. 13 5 However, the constitutional analysis would be
more absolute if factor representation were included as a nec-
essary step to ensure the equitable and constitutional appli-
cation of the apportionment formula.
1 3 6
Part A of the analysis section discusses the decisions of
state courts that agree with this hypothesis. Part B illus-
trates one company's fight in state courts across the country
against the present application of the three-factor formula.
The company was a recent advocate of factor representation
before the Supreme Court. Part C articulates the need for
factor representation as the solution to constitutional appli-
cation of the apportionment formula in the taxation of income
from intangibles.
should have considered that Mobil had only a minority interest in the subsidiar-
ies and no control over the amount of earnings paid out in dividends by the
payor subsidiaries. Id. These two points widen the gap between the dividend
income and its connection with Vermont.
134. See generally Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S.
71 (1992); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1982); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (where factor representa-
tion was not used in the apportionment of intangibles).
135. See supra part II.
136. Analysis of additional cases is necessary to fully explore issues within
the apportionment controversy. The cases introduced in part III are specifically
on point in regard to the present controversy involving apportionment of income
from intangibles. In addition, they fully incorporate the concepts previously in-
troduced in part II. They will offer the best evidence in support of factor
representation.
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A. Case Support for Factor Representation if Intangible
Business Income Is Included in the Apportionable
Tax Base
1. Partnership Profits: Homart Development Co. v.
Norberg
The application of the three-factor apportionment
formula was challenged in Homart Development Co. v. Nor-
berg.13 v Homart, a Delaware corporation with its commercial
domicile in Chicago, Illinois, develops and operates shopping
centers. 138 Its business activity within the state of Rhode Is-
land was limited to ownership and operation of a mall in
Warwick, Rhode Island." 9 Homart also owned general part-
nership interests in several partnerships engaged in the
same line of business, and was entitled to a percentage of the
distributive shares of these partnerships. 40
Rhode Island applied its three-factor apportionment
formula for the ostensible purpose of fairly taxing Homart's
income arising from its in-state activities.1 41 The dispute
centered on whether Rhode Island could include the distribu-
tive shares of the total net income from Homart's status as a
general partner, without including the partnerships' prop-
erty, payroll, and sales factors.142
Homart argued that if the total net income is increased
by the distributive shares, but the apportionment factors are
not adjusted, then the amount of net income taxable by
Rhode Island will be overstated.1 43 Homart illustrated this
position with an example giving Homart ninety percent own-
ership of a general partnership interest.1 4 4 The particular
partnership did no business in the state of Rhode Island.1 45
Homart asserted that if ninety percent of that partnership's
distributive shares were included in Homart's net income,
then ninety percent of the partnership's property, payroll,
and sales factors should be included in the denominators of
137. 529 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1987).
138. Homart Dev. Co., 529 A.2d at 116.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 119. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
142. Homart Dev. Co., 529 A.2d at 118.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the fractions. 146 If applied to the mathematical formula, this
would result in a lower "in-state" activity over "everywhere"
activity ratio, and the amount of net income taxable by Rhode
Island would be lower. 14
7
The court rejected the state's argument that partner-
ships were separate entities whose income was properly
taxed as a portion of corporate income.148 However, the court
agreed with Homart's reasoning. It noted that the formula
required that the property, payroll, and sales factors be the
"taxpayer's."'4 9 Since Homart was a "tenant of the partner-
ship," the partnership's apportionment factors were consid-
ered to be those of Homart's.15 0
Otherwise, the net income is subject to an apportionment
ratio that reflects only Homart's in-state and everywhere
business activity when, in fact, this income did not arise
from Homart's corporate business activity but instead
arose out of the partnerships' business activities that
were not reflected in the apportionment ratio .... [Such a
calculation results in] an inherent and manifest
distortion.' 5 '
In the factor representation debate, Homart was a step
toward supporting the inclusion of the property, payroll, and
sales factors of companies that provide the intangible busi-
ness income, if such income is also a part of the apportionable
income base.
2. Dividend and Interest Income: American Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue
Although Homart advocated factor representation, other
courts did not. Corporations in other states continued to ar-
146. Id.
147. Homart Dev. Co., 529 A.2d at 118. The following is the mathematical
formula referred to in Homart:
(Property Payroll Sales)
(in R.I. + in R.I. + in R.I.)
(everywhere everywhere ev-eryhere) . Total = Net y taxable
3 net y by R.I.
Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 120.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 121.
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gue in support of factor representation. In AT&T Co. v. Wis-
consin Department of Revenue, 152 AT&T's claim for redeter-
mination of taxes against the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue arose from the inclusion of intangible income from
subsidiaries in the total unitary income, while omitting from
the denominators of the apportionment ratios the factors that
contributed to that income. 153 AT&T is an interstate public
utility whose business income requires apportionment, ac-
cording to the Wisconsin Administrative Code, section Tax
2.50(1).154 The court used an analysis comparable to that
used by the Rhode Island court in Homart, and found that
factor representation is necessary if the unitary principle is
to be given any credibility. 155
The court in AT&T declared the application of the appor-
tionment formula unconstitutional because it did not meet
the external consistency test developed in Container Corp. 5 6
The factors did not reasonably reflect how the income was
generated.' 5 7 Noting that the Supreme Court had not devel-
oped a "'bright line' rule ... as to what ingredients a consti-
tutional formula must contain," the formula did not reflect a
reasonable sense of how the income was generated, and thus
violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution. 158
AT&T demonstrates that while the apportionment
formula may be the appropriate method of taxation, the ap-
plication of the formula may not meet constitutional stan-
dards. Specifically, the actual numbers Wisconsin used as
representative factors in the apportionment formula were un-
derinclusive, thus overstating the percentage of income at-
152. 422 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
153. AT&T Co., 422 N.W.2d at 629.
154. Id. at 630.
155. Id. at 632. The court decided that the subsidiaries' real property, which
contributed to the parent's intangible income, should be recognized as a prop-
erty factor. Id. The court additionally noted that if the tax department can
recognize intangible income stemming from the subsidiaries in a unitary busi-
ness and consider them "taxpayers" for that purpose, then the department
should entirely recognize the unitary principle and include the subsidiaries fac-
tors in the apportion ratios. Id.
156. Id. at 634. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
157. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1982).
158. AT&T Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 422 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
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tributable to AT&T's activities in Wisconsin. The apportion-
ment formula should have included the subsidiaries' factors.
3. Dividends: Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor
In Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor,1 5 9 the constitu-
tionality of a 1984 tax assessment resulting from the applica-
tion of the three-factor apportionment formula was chal-
lenged before the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
160
Tambrands is a Delaware corporation with its commercial
domicile in New York.161 It operates as an integrated, uni-
tary business, having both domestic and foreign
subsidiaries. 162
Tambrands conceded that it was a unitary business, and
that the intangible business income received from the divi-
dends of its foreign affiliates was properly included in the
business income to be apportioned by Maine.163 However,
Tambrands claimed that Maine was apportioning more than
was appropriate, because Maine included the affiliates' intan-
gible business income and did not include some portion of the
foreign affiliates' property, payroll, and sales factors.1
6 4
The court applied the internal consistency test developed
in Container Corp., and found that if the apportionment
formula was hypothetically applied in all the jurisdictions in
which Tambrands and its subsidiaries operated, more than
100% of its income would be subject to tax.1 65 In this hypo-
thetical, the apportionment method would not serve its pur-
pose: to tax the portion of income attributable to in-state ac-
tivities. The court held that Maine's failure to include some
portion of the foreign subsidiaries' factors in the apportion-
ment formula was inconsistent with the unitary business
principle, because the inclusion of income allowed Maine to
tax income earned outside of its borders. 16
6
159. 595 A.2d 1039 (Me. 1991).
160. Tambrands, Inc., 595 A.2d at 1039.
161. Id. at 1040.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1042.
164. Id.
165. Tambrands, Inc., 595 A.2d at 1043 (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1982)).
166. Id. at 1042. This overreaching was in violation of the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.
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Property, payroll, and sales factors are considered an ob-
jective measure of in-state activities. 167 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Maine held that the apportionment formula does
not satisfy the very principle used to justify it as a constitu-
tional method of taxation - the unitary business principle.
Tambrands is clear authority favoring factor representation.
B. Factor Representation Is Not Constitutionally Required
Without Proof of "Gross Distortion"
NCR, a manufacturer and retailer of business products,
has been a party to several tax disputes over the apportion-
ment of intangible business income. Although NCR is meet-
ing opposition in its battle concerning the equitable applica-
tion of apportionment formulas, it continues to advocate
factor representation.
1. Dividends, Royalties and Interest: The NCR Trilogy
In 1988, NCR challenged Maryland's apportionment
formula on constitutional theories in NCR Corp. v. Comptrol-
ler of the Treasury, Income Tax Division.168 NCR is incorpo-
rated in Maryland and commercially domiciled in Ohio.1 6 9
Maryland's inclusion of dividend and royalty payments from
foreign subsidiaries as taxable net income, without including
the property, payroll, and sales factors of these subsidiaries,
was the basis for NCR's challenge.1 7 0
The court held that a tax would be struck down if the
fncome attributed to the state was out of proportion to the
activities performed in Maryland.1 7 1 The case was remanded
to modify the formula.' 72 The comptroller was required to in-
clude the property, payroll, and sales factors of the foreign
167. See supra part II.A.
168. 544 A.2d 764 (Md. 1988).
169. NCR Corp., 544 A.2d at 765.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 779-80. Proving that the apportionable base was out of propor-
tion would require a showing of gross distortion. NCR found a distortion in the
denominator of 75%, whereas the comptroller found only an 11% variation. The
Court of Appeals rejected NCR's argument that Justice Steven's dissent in Mo-
bil had been adopted by the Supreme Court in Container Corp., but conceded
that the Maryland formula could lead to an unconstitutional distortion with
respect to the dividend income. Id. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text.
172. NCR Corp., 544 A.2d at 781.
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subsidiaries that generate NCR's dividend income, and test
for unconstitutional levels of distortion. 173
The following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
jected NCR's argument that the apportionment formula
should include the foreign subsidiaries' factors that gener-
ated dividend and royalty income. 174 It followed the analysis
in the Maryland NCR case and decided that a distortion of
twenty-three percent was not significant enough to require
modification of the formula. 175
In a 1991 South Carolina case, NCR raised the same ar-
gument it had raised in the previous two cases: either do not
include interest or royalty income in the apportionable base,
or include in the apportionment ratios the factors of the sub-
sidiaries generating such income. 176 The court remanded the
case, instructing the lower court to modify the formula and
compare the tax result with the tax assessment. If a constitu-
tional distortion was found between the two amounts, a re-
fund was to be granted. 177
2. Capital Gains: NCR's Final Controversy
The Supreme Court denied NCR's petition concerning
the constitutional application of the three-factor formula. 178
In NCR v. Taxation and Revenue Department, 79 the New
Mexico State Court rejected NCR's claims that the New Mex-
ico apportionment formula was unconstitutional. 8 0
173. Id.
174. NCR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1989).
175. Id. at 93.
176. NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 402 S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1991).
177. Id. at 674. A constitutional distortion requires a showing of "gross" dis-
tortion. See Norfolk & W.R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)
(explaining "gross" distortion).
178. NCR Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 986-89. The court first rejected NCR's argument that the inclu-
sion of intangible income in the apportionment formula violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause. Id. at 987-88. The two-part test for Foreign Commerce
Clause violations, established in Container Corp., was applied. Id. The court
found that the tax neither imposed multiple, inevitable taxation, nor did it vio-
late the "one voice" standard. Id. at 988. See also text accompanying notes 102-
10. NCR's second challenge asserted that their Subpart F income - intangible
income not yet distributed - could not be taxed without violating the Due Pro-
cess Clause. NCR Corp., 856 P.2d at 988. Under § 951(a)(2)(A) of the IRS code,
Subpart F income must be reported as a pro rata share, even if the income has
not been distributed. 26 U.S.C. § 951(a)(2)(A) (1988). The court rejected this
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NCR argued that the New Mexico tax statute required
inclusion of all or some of their foreign subsidiaries' factors in
computing the proper apportionment percentage.181 NCR
unsuccessfully urged the court to follow Justice Stevens' dis-
sent in Mobil. s2 NCR argued that the formula did not meet
Container Corp.'s test for fairness - internal and external
consistency. 183 However, the court followed the Maryland
and South Carolina NCR cases, declaring that it was NCR's
duty to prove that a gross distortion had occurred before a
modification of the apportionment formula would be re-
quired.1 8 4 The court concluded that the formula met the test
of fairness and was constitutional under the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses.1 8 5 Writ of certiorari was denied by both
the New Mexico Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court.18
6
In an amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme
Court, the Committee on State Taxation asserted that where
the formula has been agreed upon, but the formula's underly-
ing principles have not been followed, requiring proof of gross
distortion is of no use.'8 7 The payroll, property, and sales
that generate the income should be used to apportion that
same income.188 The apportionment formula is widely used
because it gives an accurate reflection of income generated by
in-state activities. However, if the formula does not recognize
the factors that generate that income, an accurate reflection
of in-state activities is not given.18 9
Another amicus curiae brief, submitted by the Tax Exec-
utive Institute, noted that "an apportionment formula that
fails by design to take into account the factors that generated
the apportioned income is constitutionally flawed because
argument, concluding that under the unitary business principle the state re-
quired inclusion of the Subpart F income, and New Mexico had a right to tax
their apportioned share. NCR Corp., 856 P.2d at 988-90.
181. NCR Corp., 856 P.2d at 990.
182. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
184. NCR Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982, 990-91 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
185. Id. at 991.
186. Id. at 982.
187. Amicus Brief of Committee on State Taxation at 3, NCR Corp. v. Taxa-
tion & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 93-541), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8.
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there can never be a 'rational relationship between the in-
come attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the
enterprise.' "19 Throughout all of these cases, NCR merely
sought the proper application of the three-factor apportion-
ment formula through the use of factor representation.
C. A Synthesis of the Present Controversy
Factor representation is a young concept in the field of
corporate income tax. Its parameters are not clearly defined.
Some states such as Rhode Island,' 9 ' Wisconsin, 192 and
Maine 193 have embraced the concept. Still others, as exem-
plified by the NCR cases,' 94 continue to challenge the idea.
These latter states impose ambiguous requirements, such as
proof of gross distortion, before allowing factor representa-
tion, or they allow factor representation for certain types of
intangible income but not others.
The need for factor representation is evident; the Due
Process and Commerce Clause restraints of the Constitution
require it.195 Understandably, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved the three-factor apportionment formula as a mecha-
nism for limiting state tax to the portion of income attributa-
ble to business activities within the state. 196 Although the
formula does not produce perfectly accurate taxable income
figures, "it has become.., something of a benchmark against
190. Amicus Brief of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. at 10 (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980)), NCR Corp. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 93-541),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2763 (1994).
191. See Homart Dev. Co. v. Norberg, 529 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1987).
192. See AT&T Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 422 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
193. See Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 595 A.2d 1039 (Me. 1991).
194. See NCR Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 856 P.2d 982 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993); NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 402 S.E.2d 666 (S.C.
1991); NCR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1989);
NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 544 A.2d 764 (Md.
1988).
195. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
196. See generally Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S.
71 (1992); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1982); Asarco
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501
(1942); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931). This line
of cases established the constitutionality of apportioning income for tax
purposes.
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which other apportionment formulas are judged. " 19 7 How-
ever, Justice Stevens correctly stated that unless factor rep-
resentation is allowed, corporate income will be overstated. 19
Companies will incur an unjustly high corporate tax liability.
The theory of factor representation should become a reality.
Therefore, states nationwide should adopt factor representa-
tion as a means of validating the application of the three-fac-
tor apportionment formula under the Due Process and Com-
merce Clauses.
The theory upon which factor representation is based
was set forth in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board.'99
The Court stated that the factors used in the formula must
"actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is gener-
ated."20 0 Factor representation, although simple in theory,
will not be simple in its application. Different methods of fac-
tor representation pose different problems. For example,
New York's method uses factor representation in the appor-
tionment of the taxpayer's "investment income," which is
based on a percentage that objectively measures the subsidi-
aries' investment activities within the state.2 ° ' In addition,
New York applies the traditional three-factor apportionment
formula to "business income."2 °2 Unfortunately, New York's
method does not define all forms of intangible income as "in-
vestment income,"2 °3 leaving the enigma of finding the appro-
priate application of factor representation unresolved.
197. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1982) (noting
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 282 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
198. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 461 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. 463 U.S. 159 (1982).
200. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
201. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from In-
tangibles: Allied Signal and Beyond, 48 TAx L. REV. 739, 815 (1993) (quoting
N.Y. TAx LAW § 210(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993)). The appropriate measure of
the subsidiaries investment activities within the state is obtained by the incor-
poration of a portion of the subsidiaries property, payroll, and sales factors.
202. Id. at 816 (quoting N.Y. TAX LAW § 208(8)-(9) (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1993)). Hellerstein notes that business income is federal taxable income less
investment income and income from subsidiary capital.
203. Id. at 815 n.408 (quoting N.Y. TAX LAw § 208(5)-(6) (McKinney Supp.
1993)). "Investment income... consists of income, including capital gains, from
investments in stocks, bonds, and other securities not held for sale in the regu-
lar course of business, except for income from investment in the stock of subsid-
iaries and from indebtedness from subsidiaries." Id.
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Intangibles take many forms, and the income from each
appears to require a different method of factor representa-
tion. Dividends, one form of intangible income, illustrate why
different methods of factoring may be required. Dividends
may come from the earnings and profits of a subsidiary, or
from the subsidiary's operating income. Regardless of their
source, if dividends are based on the subsidiary's gross in-
come, inclusion of 100% of the subsidiary's property, payroll,
and sales factors in the apportionment formula will not cre-
ate an accurate measure of the amount of income to be appor-
tioned.2 °4 This is because the income tax paid by the subsidi-
ary causes the subsidiary's current earnings and,
subsequently, the dividends to be less than one hundred per-
cent.2 °5 In this scenario, the subsidiary's factors would be
overrepresented. However, requiring different applications
of factor representation for each type of intangible income
would increase administration costs and offset the benefits of
factor representation.206
Other intangibles that are also a reflection of earnings
and profits include distributive shares of partnerships and in-
come in the form of capital gains from the sale of assets.20 7 In
contrast, there are forms of intangible income that are not
derived from the subsidiaries' earnings and profits. Instead,
they are expense payments that reduce the subsidiaries'
earnings.20 8 Such forms include interest payments, patent
and copyright royalties, and license and franchise fees.
These different types of intangible income share a com-
mon trait. They are included in the apportionable base, but
the subsidiaries' property, payroll, and sales factors, from
which they derive are not reflected in the apportionment
formula. The various types of intangible income presented
above offer a glimpse into the complex nature of intangibles
and the difficulty of finding an all-encompassing method of
factor representation.
Regardless of the type of intangible income, the purpose
of the three-factor apportionment formula is to enable states
204. See id. at 832-33.
205. Id. at 833.
206. Id. at 858-76. Hellerstein discusses the economic elements involved
with various types of intangible income and the complications that potentially
could arise from the use of factor representation.
207. Id. at 835.
208. Id. at 837.
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to tax the "portion" of the corporate earnings attributable to
activities in their state.20 9 The purpose of the formula is
based on the unitary business principle, which recognizes
that the operational integration of parents and subsidiaries
in a multicorporate structure lends itself to efficient and im-
proved productivity and earnings. The property, payroll, and
sales factors are the basic ingredients of a fully functioning
company, and they should represent the whole unitary
enterprise.
IV. PROPOSAL
Intangible income, like tangible income, is created
through the property, payroll, and sales activities in a uni-
tary corporate system. Therefore, the percentage of the sub-
sidiaries' property, payroll, and sales factors that contributed
to the individual amounts of intangible income received by
the parent (i.e. dividends, capital gains, interest payments)
should be included in the denominators of the apportionment
factors. A simple example of this theory can be shown by us-
ing the mathematical representation of the formula:
(Property Payroll Sales)
(in-state + in-state + in-state)
(eerywher e where everywhere) x Total = Net y taxable
3 net y - by state
210
The following steps are required to calculate the net in-
come taxable by the state. The value of the property used by
the unitary business in the state is divided by the value of the
property used by the unitary business everywhere. The same
calculation is done for the payroll and the sales factors. The
three factors are then averaged by adding them together and
dividing by three. The resulting number is the "apportion-
ment factor." The apportionment factor is then multiplied by
the total unitary income, or the apportionable base, to deter-
mine the amount of net income taxable by the state.
The following is a simplified hypothetical example to
demonstrate the need for factor representation. FactorRep
Co. is a holding company for providers of financial services.
The parent company is domiciled in New York and operates
as a unitary business, having both domestic and interna-
209. See supra part II.A-B.
210. Homart Dev. Co. v. Norberg, 529 A.2d 115, 117 (R.I. 1987).
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tional subsidiaries. FactorRep Co.'s primary services include
banking, real estate, and insurance. Its business activity
within the state of Rhode Island is limited to a small chain of
banks. FactorRep Co. also receives dividends from a subsidi-
ary in England that is involved with the buying and selling of
financial instruments. FactorRep Co. maintains that Rhode
Island has over-assessed it by using an apportionment
formula that includes the intangible business income from
the English subsidiary, but excludes the factors of that
subsidiary.
In this hypothetical, FactorRep Co.'s chain of banks in
Rhode Island hold property, payroll, and sales in the amount
of $14.2 million, $800 thousand, and $10 million, respec-
tively. The value of the unitary group's property, payroll, and
sales everywhere are, without the English subsidiary's factor
representation, $71 million, $8 million, and $200 million, re-
spectively. The unitary group's income is $150 million, which
includes $25 million of the English subsidiary's subincome.
Under this scenario, Rhode Island's tax assessment would be
$17.5 million. If Rhode Island used factor representation to
include the factors of the English subsidiary, the property,
payroll, and sales factors would increase to $85.2 million,
$8.8 million, and $400 million, respectively. The tax assess-
ment would properly decrease to $14.1 million - a signifi-
cant reduction of $3.4 million. Factor representation ensures
the equitable state income tax apportionment of unitary busi-
ness income and reduces the potential for a state to tax in-
come earned outside its borders.
This hypothetical represents factor representation in
its most primitive form. Without delving into a complex anal-
ysis, it demonstrates how factor representation leads to a
more equitable apportionment of corporate income. The pro-
posal offers a new direction at the crossroads of income
apportionment.
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, factor representation may appear to be a
callow idea in the cultivated field of corporate taxation. The
concept grew late in the season of apportionment exploration.
Theories surrounding the constitutionality of the three-factor
apportionment formula were tested and consummated. The
application of an internally and externally consistent three-
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factor formula to the business income of a unitary business is
the parameter designed to satisfy constitutional restraints on
apportionment. However, the unitary business principle,
upon which the constitutional parameters are based, is vio-
lated when intangible income from corporate subsidiaries of
the unitary business is included in the unitary income to be
apportioned, while the factors of the subsidiaries are not.
The seeds of factor representation have been planted. Their
survival and further development is cardinal to the fair taxa-
tion of corporations.
Marissa R. Arrache
